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4.1  Introduction 
This paper reviews exchange rate arrangements that deviate from 
unrestricted convertibility at uniform fixed or flexible exchange rates. 
Broadly,  these alternatives  are called  “multiple  exchange rate prac- 
tices,”  which  are formally defined  by  International  Monetary Fund 
(1981, 23) guidelines as actions that lead to exchange rate spreads in 
excess of 2 percent between buying and selling rates. They range from 
multiple  rates for commercial  transactions and  auction  markets for 
designated items to dual rates for capital movements, black markets, 
and some forms of exchange rate guarantees. The prize no doubt must 
go to Chile for introducing a “free” market for foreign exchange among 
nonhabitual,  consenting adults. Although these various forms of  ex- 
change rate policy defy a simply classification, they do arise out of a 
common concern, namely, to strike a balance between the allocative 
efficiency that almost always comes from uniform rates and the mac- 
roeconomic advantages that might be gained from a differentiated ex- 
change rate structure. 
In the aftermath of the international debt crisis Latin America ex- 
hibits  once again on a massive  scale this diversity  of  exchange rate 
arrangements. But Latin America  is not  alone in  instituting multiple 
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rates. In the early  1980s more than 40 IMF members had at least one 
multiple currency practice, and in its 1984 review the IMF (p. 37) noted: 
During 1983, as  in 1980-82, about one-third of the Fund’s members 
engaged in multiple currency practices, although on a trdde-weighted 
basis the proportion of developing-country members with these prac- 
tices has risen  considerably  since 1980 and the importance  of the 
practices in the individual economies has grown. Nevertheless, the 
recent trend toward increased  incidence of multiple currency prac- 
tices among Fund members levelled off somewhat in 1983. 
Multiple exchange rate practices have a long history. In the 1930s, 
if  not earlier, multiple rates and restricted convertibility appeared on 
a broad front throughout the world  economy. In Europe exchange 
control was widely practiced, and Raul Prebisch introduced  multiple 
rates in  Argentina.  Throughout  the 1950s and early  1960s exotic ar- 
rangements existed in virtually all countries. They were not only com- 
mon but even in some measure respectable, though never uncontrover- 
sial. Triffin (1947, 80) put the case as follows: 
Whenever balance  of payment difficulties are due, not  to inter- 
national price disparities but to accidental factors or to cyclical fluc- 
tuations in foreign income and demand, compensatory policies should 
be followed to the fullest possible extent. This requires a high level 
of reserves. . . . When  reserves are unsufficient,  foreign  or inter- 
national  assistance-such  as contemplated  under the International 
Monetary Fund-will  be necessary.  Failing this, exchange control 
should be used as a third line of defense, in order to continue com- 
pensatory policies and avoid the greater evils inseparable from de- 
flation or devaluation. The disadvantage of  the latter policies,  as 
compared to exchange control, is that their corrective effect on the 
balance of payments is likely to depend on a contraction of income 
several times as severe as the international deficit to be plugged. 
The important research question is whether multiple exchange rates 
are a perfectly sensible quest for extra policy instruments, both micro 
and macro, or ill-considered  distortions with little payoff in terms of 
effectiveness  but  major allocational costs. The answer is interesting 
from the perspective of the users of the rates, but it is quite separately 
an issue for international  supervisory agencies, specifically the IMF 
and the World Bank, which are charged with monitoring and inhibiting 
multiple rate practices. The welfare economics of exotic exchange rate 
arrangements are complicated not only by the fact of variety that makes 
this very much a study of special cases. The topic is also complicated 
because it bridges the uncompromising rigor of microeconomics, issues 
of income distribution via the price system, and the third-best features 
of macroeconomics  according to which effectiveness comes first and 
resource allocation questions are asked much later. 145  Multiple Exchange Rates for Commercial Transactions 
4.2  An Overview 
This section provides a discussion of exchange rate practices that 
result  in  a differentiated  exchange rate  structure for different  com- 
mercial transactions. Table 4.1 serves as an introduction to the topic 
and illustrates a concrete example of a multiple rate structure, the case 
of Argentina in 1949. The table shows a proliferation of rates at which 
the authorities buy and sell foreign exchange. The buying rates rep- 
resent the prices at which exporters are required to surrender foreign 
exchange, whereas the selling rates are the prices at which the central 
bank sells foreign exchange for import transactions. In each case the 
exchange rate (pesos/dollars)  is expressed as a percentage of the “basic” 
export rate. Most of those rates are fixed, but there is also a potentially 
flexible rate applied in the auction market. 
Consider now the details of the multiple rate structure. It is readily 
apparent that agricultural exports receive the least favorable rate: the 
index is 100 for these traditional exports. This is a common feature of 
countries in  which the economic structure introduces strong sectoral 
distinctions between traditional commodity exports and nontraditional 
manufacturing interests. Argentina is a good case in point. Here the 
traditional export sector is based on agriculture-wheat,  meat, hides 
and processed agricultural goods. But there is also a manufacturing 
Table 4.1  Categories and Values of  Exchange Rates in Argentina, 1949 
(Index of the basic buying rate = 100) 



















Source: Adapted from Schlesinger (1952) 
Buying rates: 
1. Preferential A: wool, hides, vegetable oil, oilcakes, tallow, meat extract, some pre- 
pared meats, poultry, live animals, and minerals (except tungsten). 
2.  Preferential B: combed wool, cheese, butter, casein, powdered milk, ques-bracho 
extract, pork, eggs, pulses, shark-liver oil, and glycerine. 
3.  Special: leather goods, footwear, selected textiles, salted meats, ground bones, fresh 
fruits, tripe. gelatin, stearin, tung oil, tungsten, and mica. 
4.  Basic: beef, mutton, wheat, corn, barley, rye, and oilseeds. 
5.  Free: receipts from all nonmerchandise transactions. 
Selling rute5: 
6. Preferential A: coal. coke, and petroleum and petroleum by-products. 
7.  Preferential B: raw materials and articles of popular consumption. 
8.  Basic: articles the import of which is considered less essential than others. 
9. Auction: imports of permissible luxury goods. 
10.  Free: remittances for all nonmerchandise transactions. 146  Rudiger Dornbusch 
sector that competes with imports and appears likewise on the export 
side. 
It is also apparent from table 4. I  that a multiple rate system requires 
an exchange control mechanism to administer and enforce the differ- 
ential  rates. On  the export side, where relatively  unfavorable  rates 
apply, the surrender of foreign exchange must be enforced. That is the 
case even if exporters may sell part of their earnings at a flexible rate. 
On the import side, where preferential rates apply, the rights to import 
must be licensed.  Where foreign  exchange for imports is auctioned, 
the control authorities  must determine the amounts to be allocated. 
The need for and modalities of the exchange control system are evident 
in table 4.2, which shows the broad possibilities for multiple rate sys- 
tems. The two main distinctions are whether for a particular transaction 
the exchange rate is fixed or market determined and whether foreign 
exchange supplies are rationed or market determined. 
System I in the table would possibly apply to the case in which for 
each transaction a specified amount of foreign exchange is allocated at 
a given rate. The distribution among competing users would be based 
on historical  precedent  or the discretion of the authority, thus posing 
the maximum potential for abuse and inefficiency. System I1 applies 
similarly to the case in which a given amount of foreign exchange would 
be auctioned among competing users. This system is frequently used 
for inessential or luxury imports. System I11 applies to both imports 
and exports. The government fixes the rate for different transactions, 
and  importers or exporters choose the amount they  wish  to  buy  of 
foreign exchange or the level of exports, and hence the level of export 
earnings. A  special case of this system is, of course, a uniform rate. 
Finally, system IV applies when the government  allows exporters to 
sell part of their export earnings from particular categories to  importers 
of some specified classes of goods. A special case is that of unrestricted, 
flexible rates at which exporters can sell all their earnings to any im- 
porter.  The splitting of markets and the matching and monitoring of 
quantities are what require exchange control authorities and give mul- 
tiple rates a bad name. 
But multiple rates are also expected to serve a policy purpose. Mul- 
tiple exchange  rates for commercial transactions are typically  intro- 
duced for one of four reasons: as a means of raising fiscal revenue; as 
Table 4.2  Possible Multiple Exchange Rate Regimes 
Type of  Exchange Rate 
Type of  Foreign 
Exchange Supply  Fixed  Flexible 
Rationed  I  I1 
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a form of taxation to affect resource allocation and income distribution; 
as a macroeconomic  shock absorber; and as an instrument  of trade- 
balance adjustment. The remainder of this paper examines each of these 
uses of multiple exchange rates. 
4.3  Fiscal Aspects of Multiple Rates 
This section examines two ways in which multiple rates have fiscal 
aspects. First, to the extent that average buying and selling rates differ 
from each other, they are a source of aggregate revenue or transfers. 
Second, differential  buying and selling rates across sectors engender 
an implicit system of protection. 
4.3.1  The lmplicit Tax-Subsidy Structure 
Consider a simple model of the world economy in which our model 
country, Argentina, is a price taker for all commodities, exportables, 
and importables alike. Suppose further that all world prices are given 
and equal to one dollar. In the absence of any taxes, transport costs, 
or other impediments to exchange, and with a uniform exchange rate, 
the domestic price of all tradable goods would be equal to the common 
exchange rate. But, in fact, exchange rates differ among transactions, 
as will, accordingly, the domestic prices of goods. Foreign exchange 
for the purchase of  some favored  import goods can  be bought  at a 
favorable rate, and the export proceeds of some categories of goods 
can be sold at high rates. Other import transactions might be implicitly 
taxed by a high price of foreign exchange, and likewise some export 
categories might be taxed by  particularly unfavorable rates at which 
foreign  exchange resulting  from  these transactions must be  surren- 
dered. A multiple rate structure thus embeds an implicit tax-subsidy 
structure. 
The implicit  tax-subsidy  structure can be analyzed  by focusing on 
two of its features. One is the difference between the average selling 
and buying prices, the difference representing net fiscal revenue to the 
government from the multiple rate system. The other is the dispersion 
of rates across transactions and the implicit tax-subsidy allocation across 
commodities. Let e;  be the exchange rate (pesos/U.S. dollars) applied 
to the ith  import  transaction, and let  ei be the exchange rate on the 
export side. The average  import  and  export exchange rates can  be 
defined simply by taking the weighted average of rates across import 
and export categories.  Let a; = MJM and bi = Xi/X be the shares of 
the ith import orjth  export transaction, respectively, in the total dollar 
value of imports (M)  or exports (A').  The average import and export 
exchange rates are then defined as: 
(1)  e,,, = CN;~;,  r, = 
I  I 148  Rudiger Dornbusch 
Fiscal revenue, in pesos, from the multiple exchange rate structure is 
equal to the excess of proceeds from foreign exchange sales over the 
revenue from purchases, such that: 
(2)  R  = e,M  - e,X. 
If trade is balanced in dollars so that X  = M,  this formula reduces to:’ 
(2’)  R  = (em - e,)M 
The right-hand side of  (2’)  shows that the government derives a net 
revenue from a multiple rate structure, provided the average selling or 
import rate exceeds the average buying or export rate. Even though 
these average rates are not available, a look at table 4.1 immediately 
indicates that this was obviously not the case in  Argentina. For ex- 
ample, the preferential import rates are below the preferential export 
rates, implying revenue losses unless, as is possibly the case, the large 
share of  “basic”  exports that command a very low rate rescues the 
fiscal balance. More on this point below. 
4.3.2  Effective Protection 
The multiple rate structure has fiscal aspects not only in the global 
revenue sense, but also in the allocation of incentives or taxes across 
activities. Let e = (em + eJ2  be the average exchange rate. Then, the 
protection or taxation involved for any particular activity is indicated 
by the relative exchange rate, ele. Activities with a high relative ex- 
change rate on the export side are implicitly subsidized, and activities 
with a high relative import rate are relatively sheltered from the world 
markets. 
In judging the tax-subsidy features of  a multiple rate system, we 
must, of course, pay attention to the fact that intermediate goods enter 
into consideration. It is therefore important to define the effective rates 
of protection implied by the multiple rate structure. The effective rate 
of protection is defined as the percentage excess of domestic over world 
value added in a particular activity. Suppose technology is linear with 
a given input requirement v per unit of  output. All goods are interna- 
tionally traded at the given world prices, and domestic prices are de- 
termined by the exchange rate structure. The effective rate of protec- 
tion for commodity  i is then given by:2 
(3) 
where a  denotes the share of the intermediate factor in income; pi*  and 
pj* are the world prices in dollars of final and intermediate goods, re- 
spectively; and Ti  and Tj  denote the percentage deviation of a particular 
exchange rate from the economywide average. Equation (3) thus re- 
ki  = (Ti  - aT,)/(1 -  a),  a = p>v/pr,  Ti  = (eje - I), 149  Multiple Exchange Rates for Commercial Transactions 
duces the multiple rate structure to the conventional representation of 
the effective protection implicit in a tariff structure. 
Equation (3) shows that the effective protection rate of an activity 
depends on the differential rates applied to final goods and inputs and 
on the differential between final goods and the economywide average. 
Table 4.1, as an example, indicates a preferential export rate (144) for 
prepared meats (sausages) and a lower rates (100) for the intermediate 
good, which in this case is meat. Suppose the income share of meat in 
the sausage industry is 40 percent and that the economywide exchange 
rate is  130. Then, the effective protection formula indicates that the 
sausage industry enjoys a 33.3 percent  effective  rate  of  protection. 
Even though the exchange rate for the final good exceeds the econo- 
mywide average by only slightly more than 10 percent, there is signif- 
icant subsidization by the fact that the intermediate good receives an 
exchange rate that is 23  percent below the average. Of  the combined 
total of 33.3 percent, only about 18  percentage points are the result of 
the favorable export rate on the final good. The remainder is accounted 
for by the implicit subsidy stemming from the fact that the intermediate 
good receives an exchange rate below the economywide average. The 
Argentine exchange rate  structure thus implies an implicit effective 
protection to processing  activities on the export side. Similarly, the 
low rate for inputs (preferential rates for coal, coke, materials) on the 
import side compared to that for final goods implies effective protection 
of domestic manufacturing. 
The Argentine example of an effective protection  structure makes 
clear the most basic point about multiple rates for commercial trans- 
actions:  they  are no different  from  a  set of  tariffs  or taxes.  Thus, 
anything that could be achieved by these multiple rates could, admin- 
istrative issues aside, be accomplished in precisely the same way by 
taxes or subsidies, or both. 
But what precisely is the equivalence between trade taxes and mul- 
tiple exchange rates? Suppose we take the basic buying rate as the 
basis.  It does not matter what the basis is, since, as we know from 
trade theory and Lerner’s symmetry theorem in particular, only relative 
prices and relative rates of taxation matter. 
We  have seen that the multiple rate structure can be expressed in 
terms of an equivalent system of effective protection rates. Next, we 
remember that  an import tariff is both  a production  subsidy  and  a 
consumption  tax.  Similarly, an export  subsidy  is  both  a production 
subsidy and aconsumption tax as well. In this interpretation commodity 
groups with a high tariff equivalent on the import side show protection 
for producers and taxation of consumers. This is the case, for example, 
with inessential imports. On the export side we have already noticed 
the protection granted to processing. 150  Rudiger Dornbusch 
To have a complete idea of the protection structure requires adding 
together (1) any implicit protection given by the exchange rate struc- 
ture, (2) protection from quotas and outright taxes or subsidies, and 
(3) taxes or subsidies implicit in advance deposits, taxes on foreign 
exchange operations on the import side, or credit subsidies  on the 
export side. These three are the main instruments of commercial policy. 
Figure 4.1  shows the results of calculations for Argentina showing a 
broad pattern of sectoral protection through all these instruments com- 
bined over the last fifteen years. 
The figure shows the peso price of a dollar of traditional exports and 
of  nontraditional exports, respectively, compared to the peso price of 
a dollar of  imports. The calculations are necessarily rough, but the 
evidence is impressive: Commercial policy through the various instru- 
ments placed a massive trade tax on traditional or agricultural exports. 
Nontraditional exports, by contrast, enjoyed a significant subsidy rel- 
ative to imports in the mid-I970s, but that differential has since almost 
disappeared. 
4.3.3  Multiple Rates and Efficiency 
Multiple exchange rates fit into this protection system as a matter 
of administrative convenience, not because they can achieve a special 
effect that cannot be replicated  by taxes or subsidies, Because they 
are so clearly equivalent to taxes and subsidies, there appears no reason 
to prefer tax-subsidy schemes over multiple exchange rates. A tax- 
subsidy scheme administered through multiple exchange rates is just 
as efficient or inefficient as the equivalent system of trade taxes or 
subsidies. Both as a means of raising general revenue and as an in- 
strument for achieving particular objectives of allocation or distribu- 
tion, trade taxes are almost always second- or third-best instruments. 
Their use as a permanent system would have to be justified by admin- 
istrative or political feasibility or convenience rather than by any in- 
trinsic optimality they possess. 
Although the use of multiple exchange rates is in all likelihood an 
inefficient way to achieve long-run revenue, distribution, or allocation 
objectives, the extent of inefficiency might easily be overestimated. It 
might  appear that a proliferation  of  multiple rates,  as in table 4.1, 
implies a particularly costly structure. In the revenue case that is true 
by comparison with, say, a uniform rate em that exceeds the export 
rate e, and thus generates revenue. But it must also be recognized, as 
Harberger (1959) has pointed  out, that not everyone in an economy 
can be protected. What matters, by Lerner’s symmetry theorem, are 
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4.4  Macroeconomic Aspects of Multiple Rates 
Multiple exchange rates can play a macroeconomic role in two ways. 
First, they  may be an effective instrument  of adjustment in  cases in 
which deficit disturbances are transitory and financing is unavailable. 
Second, they can play  the role of a macroeconomic  shock absorber, 
particularly  in the case of a transitory improvement  in  the terms of 
trade. 
4.4.1  Trade-Balance Adjustment 
In the absence of reserves or financing, or  both, trade deficits require 
adjustment. Multiple rates may be an effective adjustment mechanism 
in the case of transitory disturbances. I emphasize the case of transitory 
disturbances because persistent deficits require an adjustment that takes 
greater account of the inefficiency caused by the lasting trade distor- 
tions  implicit  in  multiple  rates. In the short run, by  contrast, these 
distortions presumably do not involve significant deadweight losses. If 
financing,  which would  be preferable  in  such a case, is unavailable, 
multiple rates may be a second-best policy. 
There are four possible adjustment policies  to correct a deficit:  a 
contraction in aggregate demand, a real depreciation, selective quan- 
titative  restrictions, and  selective  tariffs  or equivalent  multiple  ex- 
change rates.  Commercial policy, whichever form it takes, involves a 
double effect: expenditure reduction via the taxation implicit in tariffs, 
quotas, or multiple rates; and expenditure s,zGtching as a result of the 
relative price changes brought about by these policies. To  determine 
which  policy  intervention  is  optimal  will  in  general  depend on the 
source of the deficit and the particulars of the short-run macroeconomic 
flexibility of the economy. 
Consider, first, the case in which an increase in aggregate spending 
causes the deficit. If the economy faces a general increase in spending 
under conditions of high employment, there will be excess demand for 
domestic goods and a deficit. A policy combining a reduction  in ag- 
gregate spending is appropriate, and expenditure-switching policies are 
not required. But if the disturbances involve a combination of an excess 
of income over spending and no excess demand for domestic goods, 
some measure  of  expenditure switching is  also required,  since ex- 
penditure cutting by itself creates domestic unemployment. The higher 
domestic unemployment  and the more responsive demand and  em- 
ployment, the more appropriate are expenditure-switching policies than 
expenditure-reducing policies. 
The argument  against  a  short-term devaluation  as an adjustment 
policy  is well established:  In  the short run a devaluation  may have a 
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time achieving a significant improvement in the external balance. The 
reason for this is that a real depreciation will cut the purchasing power 
of  wages and hence real aggregate demand for domestic goods. The 
rise in employment caused by increased competitiveness may be small 
if  demand (foreign and domestic) is not very elastic in the short run 
and if  imported materials account for a significant share of costs and 
of the consumption basket. Under these plausible conditions a general 
devaluation is primarily a transfer abroad, not an employment policy 
or a policy of trade adjustment. Devaluation is precisely the same as 
a store announcing a sale on every item. Such a sale will result in losses 
if  most items have an inelastic demand. The store owner’s purposes 
would be better served by singling out selected items with high elas- 
ticities and concentrating  on these as  the revenue makers, thus avoiding 
the transfer applying to low-elasticity goods. This consideration is es- 
sential because it is implausible to argue that in the time frame appro- 
priate to a short-run trade problem, elasticities of supply and demand 
are uniformly high. The contrary is well established. 
It is easy to imagine a case in which the demand for imports is price 
inelastic and the domestic production of import substitutes is also un- 
responsive to price in the short run. A rise in import prices relative to 
wages would therefore merely cut the purchasing power of  labor. But 
the inelastic import demand implies that a larger fraction of the reduced 
income will be spent on imports and that demand for domestic goods 
and hence employment  declines.  But if  foreign demand and the do- 
mestic  supply of exportables are price responsive, a depreciation  on 
the export side will lead to increased revenues. Why then not simply 
concentrate the devaluation on the export side via an export subsidy, 
leaving aside the real wage cut implied by increased import prices? 
There is, of course, no reason to expect that the differential elastic- 
ities always make particular  export goods the target  of policy.  It  is 
perfectly possible that export goods are in short-run inelastic supply 
or are particularly sensitive from the point of view  of income distri- 
bution, whereas imports lend themselves better to adjustment. In any 
event, the familiar case for selective interventions rather than the ex- 
clusive use of expenditure cuts or uniform devaluation has now been 
restated. 
The next question is how to choose between quotas and tariffs or 
equivalent  multiple  exchange  rates. The use of quotas for short-run 
balance-of-payments  control has been  particularly  prevalent  in  Aus- 
tralia, while other countries have favored tariffs or multiple rates. Quo- 
tas have the advantage of volume certainty, but there is little else to 
recommend them. If import demand is inelastic, imposing selling quotas 
reduces imports but does so primarily as a consequence of the implied 
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adverse just as in the devaluation  case. There is once again no sub- 
stantive difference between selective tariffs or subsidies and equivalent 
multiple  rates,  and  only  administrative  expediency  comes  into 
consideration. 
An auction  market for a selected  group of imports (inessential or 
luxury goods), combined with a given uniform exchange rate structure 
for all  other goods, is a particularly  effective way of  coping with a 
transitory foreign exchange shortage. The authorities determine at each 
particular time how much foreign exchange to auction for the particular 
category of imports, and the exchange rate adjusts to clear the market. 
The fact that the foreign exchange is auctioned implies that in periods 
of  shortage the equilibrium  rate in  the auction market will  be high 
relative to other rates, thereby increasing fiscal revenue and exerting 
a net contractionary fiscal effect. The auction market thus serves as a 
built-in  stabilizer even on a basis of constant foreign exchange sales. 
If during shortages the amount of foreign exchange (in dollars) available 
for auction were to be reduced, the fiscal contraction (in pesos) would 
be reinforced. 
The economy reacts to the increased auction price through income 
and  substitution  effects.  The income effect  is the counterpart of in- 
creased fiscal revenues and clearly implies a reduction in the demand 
for all goods, thus helping to contain spending. The substitution effects 
work to increase the demand for goods not rationed. To  some extent 
this means that spending that is rationed in the market for luxury goods 
may spill over into other, unrestricted  imports or reduce exports. But 
that spillover may be minimal if  most of the substitution is intertem- 
poral. Suppose, specifically, that luxury goods are consumer durables. 
An increase in the current price relative to other goods and relative to 
the future price of the same durable (once the transitory  foreign ex- 
change shortage has disappeared) leads to intertemporal substitution. 
Of course. one might think that a devaluation can achieve exactly 
the same aggregate effect as an auction price system, and it is therefore 
natural  to ask what  is  special about multiple  exchange  rates in  this 
context. The chief difference is that an auction price system combines 
expenditure-switching  and  expenditure-reducing  features. A  look  at 
table  4.1  immediately  makes this  point.  An  auction  rate applied  to 
luxuries is a very special form of taxation. It applies differentially to 
high-income groups, and it applies to a commodity group that includes 
a significant share of consumer durables that are particularly sensitive 
to intertemporal substitution ch~ices.~  A devaluation, by contrast, would 
introduce only  expenditure-switching  effects and, in  the absence of 
other macroeconomic policies, might not even be made to last in  real 
terms. Once again, of course, an ad hoc tax on luxury imports would 
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4.4.2  Macroeconomic Shock Absorber 
A flexible multiple exchange rate system can also play a useful role 
in  coping with external disturbances. The classic example is that of a 
temporary improvement in the terms of trade. One possible adjustment 
is to allow a uniform real appreciation as increased real incomes are 
spent in part on domestic goods. But because the real appreciation is 
transitory, there might be a preference to avoid that adjustment with 
its implications for losses of competitiveness in nontraditional export 
and import industries. 
The alternative  is to reduce the exchange rate applicable to those 
exports benefiting from improved terms of trade and thus implicitly tax 
away part of the windfall profits. Moreover, the increased foreign ex- 
change revenues could be used to achieve transitory liberalization in 
the  auction  market, where increased  supply  would  reduce the real 
exchange rate and promote expenditure switching. An example of such 
a policy  toward  transitory terms-of-trade  improvements is  shown in 
figure 4.1. In the years 1972-74  the boom in world commodity prices 
raised  export revenues from  traditional  exports, and the  Argentine 
government responded by taxing away the improvements, thus reduc- 
ing the relative effective exchange rate to only half of that applicable 
to imports. 
A different possibility  arises if  there is a transitory terms-of-trade 
deterioration, say, from an increase in world food prices. To be more 
concrete, suppose the dollar drastically depreciates in world markets, 
which in  turn leads to an increase in  the real prices of commodities, 
including food. The dollar depreciation is seen as an overshooting that 
shortly  will  come to be  undone. The question  arises whether con- 
sumption and production patterns in the economy should be made to 
adjust to the transitory shock. Specifically, suppose that wages respond 
to the cost of living.  Should a government that has the choice allow 
the commodity price shock to spread to wages, production costs, and 
prices throughout the economy and then later face the difficulty that 
wages might  not come down easily? If  the import price shock feeds 
through the economy and wages do rise, some sectors will lose com- 
petitiveness and there will be unemployment that may well more than 
offset the improved resource allocation associated with following world 
prices. The point here is that any time there is a macroeconomic prob- 
lem in the form of less than fully flexible wages, adjustment to transitory 
disturbances is costly. Moreover, it may be more costly than simply 
running down reserves while a special exchange rate prevents the shock 
from spilling to the home economy. 
The case for multiple rates as stated so far is too favorable. If all it 
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losses, which otherwise would increase the macroeconomic variance 
of output, prices, and sectoral allocation, there would be little objec- 
tion. But the policy may well go beyond that if  disturbances in world 
trade 'are somewhat persistent. In that case the taxation of transitory 
terms-of-trade improvements in fact leads to inefficient resource allo- 
cation. The failure to pass on the improved terms of trade to producers 
implies that production will  not expand during periods when the real 
price is high. Production patterns will be frozen regardless of shifting 
world prices. When that happens the taxation of windfall gains actually 
becomes a waste of  resources. That may still be the preferred policy, 
but the authority should weigh whatever social benefits accrue from 
stable or frozen  sectoral production  patterns  or income distribution 
against the real income gains to be achieved with a resource allocation 
that leans more in the direction of prices. 
4.4.3  Sterilization 
We  have considered two possibilities in which multiple rates might 
be used to dampen the impact of disturbances on the economy. First, 
they function as a fiscal device, producing both expenditure-switching 
and expenditure-reducing effects. Second, they can be used to limit 
directly the pass-through to domestic prices and the resource allocation 
of changes in the world economy. A third possibility presents itself if 
the multiple rate practice takes the form of  the required surrender of 
foreign exchange earnings from particular transactions in return for a 
negotiable bond in domestic currency of a specific maturity. This prac- 
tice represents neither a tax (unless the applicable rate differs from that 
for other transactions) nor a reallocation  of resources.  It represents 
instead a forced loan that helps offset in the short run the monetary 
effects of export booms.4 
A policy of postponing the conversion of export earnings into do- 
mestic currency by the requirement to surrender earnings in return for 
an exchange certificate represents a combination of  sterilization and 
taxation. There is implicit taxation because of the delay in payment, 
the tax being equal to the discount on the exchange certificate. The 
higher the interest rate and the longer the forced maturity of  the ex- 
change certificate, the higher the implicit tax. The delay in  payment 
thus represents a multiple exchange practice with implicit taxation. In 
addition, of course, there is the possibility of liquidity constraints that 
make this forced loan have additional adverse effects on absorption. 
But the use of  exchange certificates  also represents  an automatic 
form of sterilization. It is strictly equivalent to the central bank's peg- 
ging the rate and expanding the base in the course of a trade surplus 
and then turning around to offset the expansion by a sale of bonds. In 
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tificates does not offset the impact of increased  real income and real 
prices on the economy. It merely avoids reinforcing  that mechanism 
by immediate monetary expansion. Since the exchange certificates do 
come to maturity at some future date, there will ultimately be a mon- 
etary expansion or else a need for a sterilization operation whereby 
the authorities sell securities and use the proceeds to pay off maturing 
exchange certificates. 
On the import side there is a similar practice in the form of advance 
deposits. Since these deposits do not carry interest, they represent a 
form of implicit taxation-the  more so, the higher the rate of interest 
or inflation. They also represent a forced loan and an automatic sta- 
bilizer in the case of  import booms.  An  import boom leads to an au- 
tomatic contraction of the money supply ahead of actual import spend- 
ing and therefore to increased interest rates and hence increased implicit 
taxation of imports. Both advance import deposits and exchange cer- 
tificates therefore share the double feature of implicit taxation through 
forced lending and monetary stabilization. 
4.5  Optimal Adjustment 
There is no question  that the absence of neutral  lump-sum taxes 
and downward rigidity and upward indexation of wages are major short- 
comings. They make it impossible to take literally any blow and adjust 
to it flexibly, without any excess burden. If full flexibility did exist, it 
would be possible at all times to allocate resources optimally and in 
the background redistribute income to meet social objectives. But once 
policy makers operate under the constraints that the effects of the price 
system on income distribution cannot be simply compensated in their 
income effects and that wages have a life of their own leading often in 
the wrong direction, there is a need to consider the trade-offs. Now it 
may be preferable to “misallocate”  resources deliberately in order to 
avoid  spillover or distribution  effects.  That course of  action  makes 
sense only when there are no better ways of compensating and only 
when disturbances are strictly transitory.’  But when these restrictive 
conditions are given, multiple exchange rates do make sense. The fact 
that in practice they are often abused should lead us to identify clearly 
the limited range of circumstances in which they apply, not to reject 
them out of hand. 
4.5.1  Optimal Intervention 
The problem of the optimal intervention  can be formulated in the 
following manner. Assume the authorities minimize a loss function that 
is linear-quadratic in two arguments: the costs of deviations from an 
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or income redistribution associated with changes in relative prices. The 
objective function is given in equation (4) below. The terms p,  and pT 
are the domestic and world real price, respectively, of the commodity 
on which policy focuses. 
(4) 
where the terms a and h are the weights policy makers attach to the 
costs of  misallocation and reallocation, and E is the expectations op- 
erator. The functional form implies an increasing marginal cost to de- 
viations from the world price and to price change. The former reflects 
the  basic  results  in  welfare economics; the  latter is  a  plausible as- 
sumption about the costs of price changes. Note also that price changes 
are assumed to be  unambiguously perceived as costs. The opposite, 
of course, might also be the case, namely. the gainers from a relative 
price change might carry more weight than the losers and hence policy 
makers could easily move in  the direction of  efficient resource allo- 
cation. But our concern here is with misallocation, and I shall therefore 
focus on the case in  which a price change is perceived as costly and 
policy makers thus prefer to “coalesce around the status quo.” 
The solution to the optimization problem is to find a path of domestic 
prices, p,  ~,,  for a given expected path p;+, that maximizes expected 
utility. The first-order condition of  this problem yields the following 
difference equation in price: 
(5)  Pf  = yp;  + SPf-I + 6Pf+l. 
Note that the equation admits of a stationary solution, p  = p*.  That 
solution prevails, of course, when the costs of price change are zero. 
Also observe that the current optimal price, p,, depends both on the 
international price and on the past and future optimal prices. The ap- 
pendix outlines the general solution, which involves the entire antici- 
pated  path of  future prices as well as the initial condition on p,-,  . I 
concentrate here on the special case in which the world price follows 
a Markov process, such that: 
(6) 
where 0 5  p 5  1 measures the persistence of disturbances, and u, is 
white noise. If  p is near unity, disturbances are highly persistent and 
the world price behaves like a random walk. Conversely, with p near 
zero the world price tends to depart only very transitorily  from the 
trend level p*. 
In this special case, and starting from a steady state pT-  I  = p,-  I,  the 
solution for the optimal price can be written as: 
1” 
2  r=O  V=--EC[  a@,+/ -  Pf+,Y + h@f+/  -  Pf+,-l)21, 
y  = a/(a + 2b),  6 = b/(a + 2b). 
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(7)  p, = p* + XE,,  x < I, 
where x is a fraction that depends both on the persistence of distur- 
bances and on the relative costs of resource misallocation and price 
changes. This fraction measures the extent to which an innovation in 
the world price translates into a domestic price adjustment. 
Table 4.3 shows the value of the coefficient x for different combi- 
nations of the relative cost hla and the degree of persistence, p. The 
table indicates that with a high persistence of disturbances, adjustment 
to current prices should be very significant, even if the relative cost of 
price-change resource allocation is judged to be many  times that of 
efficient resource allocation. 
The table brings out that even with a very transitory disturbance and 
a very high relative cost of  reallocating  resources, there is some ad- 
justment in the direction of world prices. By contrast, even when dis- 
turbances are almost totally persistent and the relative cost of reallo- 
cation is virtually negligible, there is still no instantaneous adjustment 
to world price. That adjustment occurs only over time. 
Figure 4.2 shows a simulation for an extreme case in which p  = .9, 
so that disturbances are highly persistent, and hla  = 10, so that there 
is a large cost assigned to resource reallocation or price changes. As- 
sume a steady-state value of p'  =  1, and consider a 50 percent price 
disturbance. The diagram shows the initial jump in the world price and 
the gradual  tapering off  toward  the  steady-state value.  The optimal 
response is a gradually rising domestic price that meets with the world 
price after a few years. The initial discrepancy is 25 percent. Note also 
that the domestic  price overshoots and exceeds the world price for 
some time. The reason for this is that once the domestic price has been 
pushed up toward the world price, it is costly to take it down again. 
As the world price falls following the initial jump, the domestic price 
follows but less rapidly. Even so, the discrepancy is less than 10 percent 
after only three years and rapidly diminishes to zero. 
What does the model imply for multiple rates? If disturbances are 
relatively  short-lived and if  policy makers perceive a price change to 
be costly because of its effects on income distribution, unemployment, 
Table 4.3  The Optimal Degree of  Adjustment to Disturbances: x 
Relative Cost of Resource Reallocation: bla 
.2  1  10 
p = .1 
p  = .5 
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Fig. 4.2  The optimal adjustment to a world  price shock. 
or inflation indexation, using transitory multiple exchange rate inter- 
ventions is appropriate. The multiple rate should dampen the impact 
of the world price change on the economy, but (almost) never com- 
pletely offset the price change. It is worth thinking about the optimal 
dampening, because doing so reminds us  to make a judgment about 
the  persistence  of  disturbances  and  the  relative  costs  of  resource 
reallocation. 
The difficulty with such a formulation is that  it assumes from the 
outset that inefficient resource allocation is the only way to avoid or 
contain the costs of  resource reallocation.  But clearly it is also con- 
ceivable to use fiscal redistribution  combined with efficient resource 
allocation. If disturbances are highly persistent, it is more efficient to 161  Multiple Exchange Rates for Commercial Transactions 
use fiscal redistribution than trade taxes: the incomes of the gaining 
producers would be taxed and the proceeds distributed to losers. 
4.6  Summary 
The use  of  multiple  exchange rates represents a combination  of 
expenditure reducing or fiscal policy and expenditure switching. Mul- 
tiple rates act in the manner of a differentiated tariff and, except for 
administrative considerations, amount to exactly the same thing. There 
are good reasons to use these measures as a policy to cope with tran- 
sitory disturbances. In the case of trade deficits, and in the absence of 
financing, it may be efficient to concentrate adjustment on a few sec- 
tors. Across sectors there are differential speeds of adjustment, and a 
policy  that focuses exclusively  on  sectors with  high  responsiveness 
may be effective. But there are also costs associated with adjusting the 
economy to transitory disturbances, and therefore multiple rates can 
be employed to concentrate adjustment  on sectors or activities with 
relatively low costs. 
In  the case of transitory  surpluses induced  by  terms-of-trade  im- 
provements, multiple rates are particularly effective. They serve a di- 
rect fiscal role as a built-in stabilizer, thereby reducing the multiplier 
impact of a disturbance on the economy. But furthermore, they dampen 
the effect by reducing the resource reallocation brought about by tran- 
sitory shocks. The extent to which policy makers should dampen the 
impact of world prices on the nation’s economy depends on the per- 
sistence of disturbances and on the political costs of adjustment. The 
lower these adjustment costs and the more persistent the disturbance, 
the more complete the optimal adjustment to world prices. 
Having made the case for the limited use of multiple exchange rates, 
I  conclude with  two warnings. First, it is important  to bear in  mind 
that any policy rule that always dampens the domestic repercussions 
of price increases but  does not  in a symmetric way  offset  declining 
world prices in fact systematically reduces the profitability of the sector 
that is affected. Argentine traditional exports are a good case in point 
of a policy that has been overused. Second, multiple rates can easily 
be abused because they do not represent as  overt a tax-subsidy scheme 
as direct taxes and subsidies. Argentina serves once again as the ex- 
ample (Carfa  Econdmica 1983, 46): 
One of  the clearest examples of the costs in terms of distortions 
of excessive multiple rates occurred in  1973. In that year the inter- 
national price of wheat stood at a record level and so did the domestic 
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price at an all time low. At the same time, with the help of a whole 
battery of measures, exports of automobiles to Cuba were subsidized 
and were paid for by  Cuba with promissory  notes that exporters 
discounted with the central bank. The result is the expected: guided 
by the low domestic prices farmers did not produce much wheat and 
thus Argentina missed the opportunity to export a competitive com- 
modity at good prices; instead we exported automobiles in exchange 
for which we received notes that for many years (perhaps even now?) 
are part of the international reserves of our central bank. (Translation 
mine) 
Appendix: Optimal Adjustment to World Prices 
Policy makers maximize an intertemporal loss function: 
The first-order condition, or Euler equation, is: 
(A2) Pr  = YP~'  + 6pt-l  + 6Pr+l, 
y = a/(a + 26),  6 = b/(a + 26). 
It is immediately apparent from (A2) that with 6 = 0 there is always 
full and instantaneous adjustment to world prices. 
Equation (A2) is a difference equation that can be solved forward.6 
Using the lag operator Lx, = x,-  I, we can obtain from (A2): 
(-42')  (LZ -  L/P + IlP,+l =  -(Y/61P,*, 
which has one stable root. Let XI,  A2 be the roots, of which XI is less 
than unity in absolute value. Then, rewriting (A2') yields: 
and hence: 
cc 
Pt  = AlPr-1 + (r/6)CAiPf+i> 
i=  1  (A3) 
where it is assumed that A,, A,  =  1. 
that: 
Suppose now that the world price follows a Markov process, such 
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where E, is white noise. Then (A3) reduces to: 
Notes 
1.  Equation (2) can be rewritten as R  =  e,(M - X)  + (em - e,)M. The first term 
represents revenue from depleting foreign exchange reserves and thus cannot properly 
be thought of as a net revenue. 
2.  The effective rate of protection of industry i is defined as the percentage excess of 
domestic value added over world value added, measured in a common currency, or: 
ki = [(pi - vpj) -  e(p: - vp;)]/e(pf - vp;) 
= [(eipf - ep;v) - e(pf - vpJ]/e(p: - vp;). 
Dividing by e and pf  and defining the exchange rate relative to the average rate, T, = 
(e/e - I), reduces the equation to (3). 
3. See Dornbusch (1984b) for an analysis of this argument in the context of Chilean 
currency overvaluation. 
4.  See Wiesner (1978). 
5. It is a silly practice to argue that neutral lump-sum taxes and transfers will address 
distributional issues, even though we know that these tools simply do not exist. Sticking 
one’s head in the sand, refusing any discussion of second best for societies in which 
distribution often is more important than efficiency, is poor political economy. 
6.  See Sargent (1979, 170-200). 
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Comment  Manuel Guitian 
Over a longer period than I like to acknowledge by now, I have enjoyed 
reading Rudiger Dornbusch’s papers, but this, of course, does not mean 
that 1 have always agreed with them. The paper I have been invited to 
discuss can hardly provide an exception to the rule, particularly since 
my interest in its subject matter is a strong one. This is not only because 
multiple exchange  rate arrangements are a matter of concern from a 
theoretical  and a policy  standpoint, but  also because the topic is of 
direct importance to those of us who work at the International  Mon- 
etary Fund. As the reader may  know, the Fund has to oversee the 
observance of a code of conduct on the part of member countries in 
their international economic relations; as such, the Fund (and not the 
World  Bank, as the paper indicates) is the only international  agency 
that exercises control  over and  regulates  the  exchange practices of 
those member countries. As a result the institution has jurisdictional 
responsibilities  to  discharge  in the general  deployment of exchange 
arrangements, which, needless to say, include multiple exchange rate 
regimes, or as they are referred to in Fund jargon, “multiple currency 
practices .” 
In  exercising jurisdiction  over multiple  exchange  rates, the Fund 
monitors on  a continuing basis developments in members’ exchange 
systems. As Dornbusch  points out in his quotation of the  1984 IMF 
Annual Report, there has been an increase in the incidence in multiple 
exchange rates since 1980, with some leveling off taking place on this 
front during 1983. Broadly speaking, the proportion of Fund members 
resorting to some form of multiple exchange rate regime remains sig- 
nificant. Partly because of this, when I saw the original title of the paper 
I  wondered whether “exotic”  (in the sense of unusual, rare, uncom- 
mon) was the most appropriate term to apply to multiple exchange rate 
arrangements.  I At the risk of unmasking an occupational disease that 
afflicts those who are concerned on a regular basis with the safeguard 
of common norms of behavior,  I  must say that “deviant”  came to my 
mind as a more appropriate term. 
Let me now turn to the paper itself.  It deals with multiple exchange 
rates applicable to commercial transactions, and from a general stand- 
Manuel Guitian is deputy director of  the Exchange and Trade Relations Department 
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point I found some broad grounds for agreement with what Dornbusch 
has to say on the subject. I  can illustrate a few of those grounds by 
referring to his statement of the equivalence between multiple exchange 
rates and tax-subsidy trade schemes, particularly the categorization of 
both of  them as “second- or  third-best instruments.” I also concur with 
the assertion that the use of multiple exchange rates can be justified 
only in terms of “administrative  or political feasibility or convenience 
rather than by any intrinsic optimality they possess.”  I would under- 
score even more  strongly Dornbusch’s recognition that multiple ex- 
change rates are of “limited  use”  and that any resort to using them 
should be only “transitory”  to deal with  “short-lived”  disturbances. 
All of  these are points with which I cannot but concur. I would add in 
this context that I believe these considerations apply to multiple ex- 
change rates in general, that is, to those systems established for com- 
mercial transactions, as well as to dual exchange rate regimes used to 
keep current transactions separate from capital transactions. 
With areas of agreement out of  the way-which  is the easy part of 
my task-let  me now turn to the domains of disagreement. These are 
varied  and  I  must  say they  concern both  matters of  substance and 
matters of emphasis. Let us consider the reasons that are typically 
adduced for the introduction of multiple exchange rates. The bulk, if 
not  all, of  them fall  into two main  categories-which,  by  the way, 
encompass the four purposes identified in the paper. Multiple exchange 
rates have been used either as means to repress balance-of-payments 
pressures-these  would include Dornbusch’s categories of macroeco- 
nomic shock absorption and trade-balance adjustment-or  as means to 
attain certain other objectives that are not directly related to the balance 
of  payments-such  as, as noted  by Dornbusch, objectives regarding 
fiscal revenues, resource allocation, and income distribution. 
A first area of disagreement-though  perhaps only partial-arises  in 
connection with a broad conclusion the paper seems to draw concerning 
the use of multiple exchange rates for reasons other than the balance 
of payments. Dornbusch begins by suggesting that multiple exchange 
rates are an inefficient way of achieving long-run revenue, distribution, 
and allocation objectives, and this idea seems to me unassailable so 
far as it goes; but then the author proceeds to suggest that there is a 
risk that the extent of the inefficiency arising from multiple exchange 
rates might easily be overestimated. In my experience, it is far more 
likely for the risk  to run  in  the other direction,  in  other words, the 
extent of the inefficiency might be underestimated. I do not think the 
case for overestimation of the inefficiency caused by multiple exchange 
rates (whichever that case may be) was made in the paper, and I there- 
fore fail to be persuaded  by the statement. 
Other areas of  disagreement-which  are related  to the first one- 
concern the particular tone of some of the arguments presented more 167  Multiple  Exchange  Rates for Commercial Transactions 
than their direction.  My comments in this regard reflect the insight  I 
have  gathered  on this  subject  in  my  work at the  Fund.  From that 
standpoint, I would stress far more than the paper does the disadvan- 
tages of multiple exchange rates that result from the lack of transpar- 
ency of their effects. In fact, I  thought the algebraic derivations and 
the resulting example provided in the section on effective protection 
conveyed this point quite effectively.  I  would contend that the costs 
of  the opaque tax-subsidy  schemes that are implicit in  multiple  ex- 
change rate arrangements typically exceed those that accrue through 
direct and explicit budgetary means. 
Another point I would raise in this context concerns the “transito- 
riness”  that is typically alleged when multiple exchange rate regimes 
are employed. My impression is that the paper understates an important 
risk associated with resorting to such regimes: If empirical evidence is 
to be believed, once they are established, multiple exchange rates typ- 
ically  prove  difficult  to  eliminate and  tend  to become a  permanent 
feature of the exchange  system. In  my  mind, this is nothing but the 
corollary  of the observation that multiple  rates are introduced most 
frequently for administrative or political convenience. The very process 
that makes devices like multiple rates more acceptable as a means to 
suppress an imbalance than the adoption of more direct policy actions 
is what renders them more difficult to eliminate. In other words, what 
is convenient to adopt is usually inconvenient to abolish. To the extent 
that this is the case, the costs of multiple exchange rates in terms of 
allocative  efficiency  will  outweigh  their usefulness  as palliatives  to 
existing  imbalances  and  render  them  less  than  sensible  as  policy 
instruments. 
In any discussion of multiple exchange rates, there must be an eco- 
nomic imbalance of some sort somewhere in the background, otherwise 
there would be no purpose to the discussion. The imbalance may be 
large or small, and its source may be exogenous or endogenous, tran- 
sitory or permanent, and so forth. The particular policy response that 
will  be required  will  depend on some of these characteristics of the 
imbalance.  For example, an exogenous (not policy  determined) and 
transitory  (reversible) imbalance  will  typically  call for temporary fi- 
nancing through international reserves or foreign borrowing. This pos- 
sibility, however, is deliberately left out in the paper, and I cannot but 
wonder about the reason for this particular assumption. The assumption 
can only provoke  the question whether it  is  realistic to say that  an 
economy unable to finance a transitory disturbance is not in fact con- 
fronting a temporary balance-of-payments problem. 
The discussion of the macroeconomic aspects of multiple exchange 
rates introduced  for  balance-of-payments  purposes (the sections on 
trade-balance adjustment and macroeconomic shock absorption) seem 
to me the least persuasive in the paper. If  the source of imbalance is 168  Rudiger Dornbusch 
determined by domestic policy  (endogenous) and leads to an unsus- 
tainable level or rate of the growth of aggregate demand or to an in- 
appropriate costiprice  relationship with  the rest of the world, policy 
adjustments directly linked to the source of the problem are required. 
Palliatives like multiple exchange rates, exchange restrictions, or  quan- 
titative controls cannot be substitutes for appropriate policy action on 
any sustained basis.  In effect, they tend to compound the imbalance 
by  adding to the distortions  in the economy. This is not  to say that 
there may not be specific instances in  which multiple exchange rates 
can offer a potential useful option by providing a respite to allow the 
necessary policies to be put in place and take hold, but I would contend 
that these instances are rare. 
My observations to this point also apply to a specific sort of multiple 
exchange rate system often discussed in the literature, namely, a regime 
of dual exchange  rates that are applicable separately  to current and 
capital transactions. As far as I know, there is no presumption that the 
resource allocation costs that result from multiple exchange rates de- 
pend on the particular type of transactions to which  those rates are 
applied.  Nevertheless, an argument is frequently  made to the effect 
that an economy should be insulated from the impact of volatile (and 
massive?) capital flows and that a dual exchange rate system is useful 
for this purpose. There are problems with this argument, though, since 
the larger the capital flows, ceteris paribus, the wider the discrepancy 
between the exchange rates and, with this discrepancy, the deeper the 
potential distortions (if the markets are successfully separated) or the 
stronger the leakages between  the two markets (if, as is more likely, 
transactions cannot be kept separate). In this context, it may be worth 
stressing that capital movements frequently  reflect the stance of do- 
mestic policies, and when such stance is inappropriate, dual exchange 
rates again can only  serve to repress and compound the underlying 
imbalance rather than to solve it. 
Finally, there are two further observations that are worth making in 
this context: one is that even though dual exchange rates can contain 
or temporarily slow the speed of capital flight, they cannot eliminate 
the prospect of international reserve losses; the other is that when an 
imbalance is incurred to prevent or postpone adjustments needed in 
particular  sectors of  the economy-as  is  the case with  attempts to 
sustain unrealistic real wage levels-the  use of dual exchange rates to 
suppress the imbalance may make those sectors able to participate in 
the free exchange market, instead of those sectors for which the scheme 
was intended, the ultimate net beneficiaries of the scheme. 
In conclusion, perhaps one of the stronger arguments that has been 
made in favor of  multiple exchange rates is that they are more efficient 
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ticularly quantitative restrictions, which are administratively cumber- 
some and relatively easy to circumvent. This point is briefly referred 
to in  the paper,  but  I  think  it  warrants more elaboration. It is also 
important to note that in economies in which controls are pervasive, 
multiple rates can serve to impart some influence to price incentives 
that otherwise might not be allowed to operate at all. Again, all these 
arguments, despite their partial validity, lose their relevance if they are 
used to advocate multiple exchange rates as a regime that can be sus- 
tained over extended periods of time: their long-run costs in terms of 
efficiency will  clearly exceed any benefits that may be derived from 
them in the short run. 
Note 
1.  The original title of Dornbusch’s paper was “Exotic Exchange Rate Arrangements.” 
and it was later revised to  “Multiple Exchange Rates for Commercial Transactions.” 
Comment  Richard C. Marston 
This paper on exotic exchange rate arrangements is of the high quality 
we have come to expect from Dornbusch. It features several simple 
but insightful analytic models, stripped to their bare essentials to high- 
light the issues  under consideration  and  buttressed with  numerous, 
well-chosen  examples. Dornbusch  provides  an eclectic  view  of  the 
literature on what the IMF calls “multiple exchange rate practices,” 
which  include  legally  approved systems of  multiple  commercial  ex- 
change rates and “dual exchange markets,” as well as “black markets” 
outside the law. 
The subject  I  would  like to focus on here-dual  exchange rates- 
forms the analytical core of Dornbusch’s paper. By dual rates, we mean 
exchange rate arrangements that separate capital-account transactions 
from most if  not all trade transactions, with the former carried out in 
the so-called free market. Dual exchange markets are often viewed by 
governments as an effective way to  insulate the trade account, and 
perhaps the real sector, from financial disturbances affecting the ex- 
change  rate. The academic literature  on dual markets, on the other 
hand, focuses on those channels of transmission that still remain open 
under dual rates. 
Richard C. Marston  is  a  professor of finance  and  economics at the  University  of 
This comment reviews the version of the Dornbusch paper presented at the NBER- 
Pennsylvania and research associate of the National  Bureau of  Economic Research, 
World Bank conference. Subsequently, Dornbusch made some changes in that paper. 170  Rudiger Dornbusch 
Before  addressing Dornbusch’s analysis, I  would  like to  begin  by 
examining those channels that dual markets succeed in  cutting off, at 
least under some dual rate systems. This will  help in  understanding 
how these systems work, but also in explaining why it is important to 
keep the free market rate confined to financial transactions. There are 
two channels I  would like to mention. 
The first is the influence of changes in  exchange rates on domestic 
wages and aggregate supply. To the extent that imports consist of con- 
sumer goods, a depreciation of the domestic currency exerts upward 
pressure on wages and hence on the supply prices of domestic goods. 
To the extent that imports consist of materials used in production, the 
influence of exchange rate changes on aggregate supply is even more 
direct. It is immediately obvious why dual exchange rate systems al- 
most  invariably  channel wage  goods and  imported  materials,  often 
called  “essential  imports,”  through  the regulated  exchange market, 
thus cutting off this important channel. 
The second channel is the  influence of exchange  rate changes on 
aggregate demand. A depreciation may lead to changes in relative prices, 
be  they  the relative prices of  foreign  to domestic goods or those of 
traded to nontraded goods, thus shifting aggregate demand. As long as 
trade transactions are confined to the regulated  market, this channel 
is also cut off. 
Thus, on the positive  side, the dual rate system can cut off those 
price  channels by which  the exchange rate, and  hence financial dis- 
turbances, affect the real sector of the economy. If a government wants 
to  shield  its  nation’s economy from temporary financial shocks, for 
example, then cutting off these channels has much  to be said for it. 
Dornbusch cited in his original conference paper the example of Mex- 
ico’s dual rate, which was adopted in response to the financial crisis 
of August  1982. Here is a case where it was clearly advantageous to 
separate the exchange markets for real and financial transactions, even 
though  the insulation afforded by the dual rate system was both  in- 
complete and temporary in nature. 
Dornbusch, as well  as earlier  writers  on  dual  markets, however, 
emphasizes the negative features of dual rates, specifically, the failure 
of dual rates to cut off certain financial channels of transmission. The 
dual exchange  market  has an interesting effect on real  asset values. 
The separation of real and financial transactions holds the price level, 
the deflator of asset values, constant (or at least exogenous with respect 
to financial disturbances originating abroad). But the nominal value of 
foreign assets changes. The depreciation  of the free rate applying to 
financial transactions leads to a rise in asset values. And this change 
in wealth in  turn affects aggregate demand. If the depreciation  is ex- 
pected, moreover,  interest  rates also adjust. So the demand for real 
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Note that these are channels that do not  exist in the simple open 
economy model without capital mobility, the model familiar from the 
work of  James Meade and others in the 1950s. In such a model, with 
the exchange market consisting of current-account transactions only, 
the real sector of the economy is insulated from all foreign disturbances, 
at least in the simplest versions of the model. In the dual market model, 
in contrast, the real sector is not  insulated, because nominal  wealth 
and interest  rates are affected  by changes in the financial or “free” 
exchange rate. 
The dynamics of wealth accumulation in the dual market model are 
also quite different from those found in the purely flexible exchange 
rate models of Kouri (1976) and Dornbusch and Fischer (1980). In the 
Kouri or Dornbusch-Fischer model, a current-account surplus is ac- 
companied  by  an appreciation  of the exchange rate, since the accu- 
mulation of wealth is in the form of foreign assets and that leads to an 
excess demand for money. In contrast, in the dual market model, as 
was pointed out by Flood (1978), a current-account surplus is accom- 
panied by a depreciation  rather than an appreciation of  the domestic 
currency because the accumulation is in the form of  money balances 
rather than foreign assets (because the current-account imbalance is 
satisfied with reserve flows). In any case, we see that the dual exchange 
rate system cannot cut off the financial channel by which changes in 
the free exchange rate affect the real sector. 
The case against the dual market system is stronger than suggested 
so far if  some real trade transactions take place in the free market. In 
that instance the dual market  system does not succeed in cutting off 
even the wage and relative price channels by which the exchange rate, 
and hence financial disturbances, can affect the real sector of the econ- 
omy. But for that reason, it is no longer adequate for a model of dual 
markets to focus on wealth and interest-rate effects alone, as most of 
the literature has done. 
In a later section of the paper, Dornbusch introduces a more complex 
model  of a dual market that permits  some categories of imports and 
exports to be traded in the free market. In this model the relative prices 
of traded goods in the regulated and free markets can change, thereby 
opening up a new channel of transmission. I would argue that Dorn- 
busch does not go far enough in modifying the earlier model to incor- 
porate relative price effects. First, the model still does not include any 
relative price of domestic and foreign goods. This is a channel of in- 
fluence incorporated into the dual market models of both Macedo (1982) 
and Cumby (1984). Second, there is still no supply sector in the model. 
We  therefore  have no idea how the labor force is reacting to changes 
in all of these relative prices. 
But here we reach an important issue concerning research on such 
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dual market, Dornbusch has had to grapple with a third dynamic equa- 
tion. In his model, foreign capital can be accumulated in the free mar- 
ket, since a current-account surplus can occur in that market. He there- 
fore presents an additional accumulation equation. With three dynamic 
equations, the author now resorts to an analysis of the steady state 
alone. I  would argue that we are much more interested  in the short- 
run dynamics than in the long-run steady state. How do we deal with 
the short run in a model with three dynamic equations? One answer is 
to simulate the  model  dynamically using  estimated  or nonestimated 
parameters. Most economists are unenthusiastic about simulation anal- 
ysis, perhaps because simulations depend so much upon the particular 
parameters chosen for the model. But I would argue that simulations 
are preferable to both of the alternatives: focusing on the steady state, 
as Dornbusch does, or oversimplifying the model by leaving out im- 
portant channels. Having said that, I  should immediately add that the 
steady-state analysis Dornbusch provides is of considerable interest in 
itself. No one else, as far as I  know, has ever tackled the problem of 
incorporating real sector transactions into the so-called free market. 
I have focused my remarks on the insulation issue because I believe 
this lies at the heart of dual markets. But in  closing, I  would like to 
mention two other issues that are important in evaluating dual exchange 
rates. The first concerns the distortions to efficient resource allocation 
that occur when  the  dual  rates, or multiple  rates, involve  different 
prices for different goods. Dornbusch does an excellent job of probing 
the inefficiencies that arise in these dual rate systems, as well as in 
other “exotic” arrangements. These inefficiencies are a good argument 
for using dual rates only in speculative crises, although, as with many 
government policies,  the temporary expedient may  prove to be  per- 
manent. The second issue is one that neither Dornbusch nor the other 
writers  1  have  mentioned  have  addressed: the problem  of  leakages 
between markets in the dual market system. If the free market premium 
is large enough, there is obviously an incentive to transfer transactions 
to the most  advantageous market. The possibility of leakages places 
an effective constraint on the free market premium, if  only to prevent 
resources from being diverted into new ways to cheat the system. We 
need to see more analysis of this issue to understand better the incen- 
tives for cheating and their effects on the workings of the system. 
Dornbusch does not cover all of these issues, but his paper provides 
a firm foundation on which future analysis of the dual market system, 
as well as other “exotic”  arrangements, can be based. 
References 
Dornbusch, R., and Fischer, S. 1980. Exchange rates and the current 
account. American Economic Review 70 (December):  960-71. 173  Multiple Exchange Rates for Commercial Transactions 
Cumby, R.  1984. Monetary policy  under dual exchange rates. NBER 
Working Paper no. 1424. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Eco- 
nomic Research. 
Flood, R. 1978. Exchange rate expectations in dual exchange markets. 
Journal of  International Economics 8 (February): 65-77. 
Kouri, P.  1976. The exchange rate and the balance of  payments in the 
short run and in the long run: A monetary approach. Scandinavian 
Journal of  Economics 78 (May): 280-304. 
Macedo, J. de. 1982. Exchange rate behavior with currency inconvert- 
ibility. Journal of  International Economics 12 (February): 65-8  1. This Page Intentionally Left Blank